MacKay D.D.S. v. R. – TCC: Mandatory termination of year end deferral by dentist not basis for appeal

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/site/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/66681/index.do New Window

MacKay D.D.S. v. The Queen[1] (February 1, 2014) involved a dentist with a January 31 year end.  Because of the operation of sections 9 and 34.1 of the Income Tax Act[2] he was required in 2006 to terminate a previously available deferral stemming from this non-calendar year end:

[7]             The calculation that they provided is set out below.

(a)  Include income for 2006 fiscal period – $393,124

(b) Include 11/12 of income for 2006 fiscal period – $359,744

(c)  Deduct 11/12 of income for 2005 fiscal period – $214,749

(d) Net income inclusion – $538,130.

Dr. MacKay objected to this treatment:

[2]             Section 34.1 is intended to limit the tax deferral that would otherwise be available to an individual who has a fiscal period for a business that does not coincide with the calendar year. Dr. MacKay is subject to this provision because the fiscal year end for his dentistry practice is January 31 and he made an election under subsection 249.1(4) of the Act to retain this fiscal period for purposes of the Act.

[3]             Dr. MacKay does not dispute the computation required by section 34.1 but questions whether the provision is enforceable. He submits that the provision is harsh in his particular circumstances, and he suggests that he is treated differently from individuals who have a calendar year end for their fiscal period.

The court dismissed the appeal rejecting the taxpayer’s claim that he was being treated harshly:

[13]        I am not satisfied that the result is harsh in this particular case. On the contrary, Mr. MacKay seems to have benefited from a tax deferral in the 2005 taxation year relative to individuals whose businesses have calendar year ends. I fail to see how the result is harsh.

[14]        In this case, Dr. MacKay has not alleged that any income has been subject to double tax or that the result is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Even if I were satisfied that the result is harsh, which I do not, this would not be a basis on which I could grant relief. In this regard, it is well-established that this Court cannot grant relief on grounds only that the result is harsh: Lans v The Queen, 2011 FCA 290.

[15]        The appeal will be dismissed, with costs.

[1]2014 TCC 33.

[2] R.S.C. 1985. c. 1 (5th Supp.).